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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 2011073 8-SC

DAMIEN A. CANDLAND,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE MISCONSTRUES CANDLAND'S LEGAL
ARGUMENT

The State asserts that Candland5s reliance on State v. Love 11, 2011 UT 36, 262
P.3d 803, is misplaced because Lovell was decided under a "prior version of the Plea
Withdrawal Statute under which a rule 11 violation sufficed to permit withdrawal of a
plea" and that State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, 279 P.3d 371, "significantly alter[s] the
analysis55. See Aplee. Br. at 11-12. The State also asserts that Candland argues that the
controlling test "is one of strict compliance with the Requirements of Rule ll. 55 See
Aplee. Br. at 11.
The State misconstrues Candland5s legal argument. While Lovell was decided on
an older statutory version of Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(a), which only required a showing
of "good cause" to withdraw a guilty plea, Candland has not and does not argue that the

district court erred because he showed "good cause" to withdraw his plea. Rather,
Candland asserted in his opening brief that his plea was not "knowing and voluntary".
See Aplt. Br. at 6-7, 9, 11. Moreover, Candland actually asserted that district courts must
"strictly compl[y] with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty
plea..." See Aplt. Br. at 7. Candland does not assert that strict compliance means an
exact recitation of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In fact, in Lovell, this
Court held, "Strict compliance ... does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of
the rights listed ... [T]he substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of
their rights and thereby understand the basic consequence of their decision to plead
guilty." Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ^ 14 (citation omitted). Candland asserts that the holding in
Lovell, that "our cases impose a duty on the trial judge under rule 11(e) to determine that
a defendant has been affirmatively advised of the rights he is waiving", is still
controlling. See Id. at <| 12.
The crux of Candland's argument is that the district court failed to ensure that
Candland understood the aggravating elements of the murder charge. See Alexander;
2012 UT 27, <[ 35( "for a plea to be knowing and voluntary, a defendant must possess
more than a conceptual understanding of the nature of the offense; he must have an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.") (internal citation omitted).
The State asserts that Candland did understand the aggravating elements of the
offense and that the record shows that his confusion related only to the aggravated assault
charge. See Aplee. Br. at 20. Candland disputes the State's argument. After the factual
summary was presented by the prosecutor and the district court asked Candland whether
2

he was pleading guilty "because you did these things," Candland did not answer (R. 264:
12). After consulting with trial counsel, Candland's trial counsel explained that "one of
the issues" troubling Candland related to the aggravated assault charge (R. 264: 12). As
the record shows, Candland's prior counsel only discussed "one of the issues" Candland
expressed to his counsel. Trial counsel did not discuss the other issue related to the
aggravated elements of the murder charge (R. 264: 12-13).
After trial counsel related Candland's concern with the aggravated assault charge,
the district court stated:
Mr. Candland, the purpose of my question was to - was I want to make sure I
understand that you understand that your plea today will conclusively establish,
will prove that you caused the death of another person, under the circumstances
that were described, and that you physically harmed another person, causing the
injuries that were described and that you did these things knowingly or
intentionally; do you understand that?
(R. 264: 13).
With Candland's affirmative response to this question, the State attempts to bootstrap Candland's answer here to the prosecutor's prior recitation of the factual basis to
show that Candland admitted to understanding that he committed the murder for the
purpose of the aggravating elements of the charge. See Aplee. Br. at 16, 20.
Candland asserts, however, that his affirmative answer to the district court's
question does not show that he understood how his alleged behavior supported the
aggravating elements of the crime charged. Rather, this portion of the record shows that
Candland aclcnowledged only causing the death of another person and physically harming
another person. Candland was not responding to the district court's prior question of

3

whether he was pleading guilty because he committed the crime as described by the
prosecutor. Instead, Candland was responding to the question at hand, whether he caused
the murder and whether he physically harmed another person.
The fact remains that the district court failed to ensure that Candland understood
how his alleged behavior supported the aggravating elements of murder.
The State asserts that the combination of Candland5 s Statement of Defendant in
Support of Plea of Guilty or No Contest and Certificate of Counsel ("Statement"), and the
judge's colloquy, are sufficient to show that Candland's plea was knowingly and
voluntary entered. See Aplee. Br. at 14-16. While it is true that Candland's Statement
was incorporated into the record, rule 11(e)(4)A) still requires the district court to find
that the "defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea
is entered ... and that the plea is an admission of all those elements."
The State apparently does not assert that a "plea affidavit" alone nor questioning
by a judge on whether a plea affidavit was signed and understood by a defendant satisfies
the requirements of rule 11(e) or due process when ensuring a defendant's plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered. Rather, a plea affidavit may be used in conjunction
with the plea colloquy and other "surrounding facts and circumstances." See Alexander,
2012UT27,f 31.
The fact that Candland had a formal 9th grade education (R. 141), is reason
enough for the district court to determine during the plea colloquy whether or not
Candland actually understands "the law in relation to the facts." Merely asking
Candland whether he understood his Statement does not let the district court know
4

whether Candland truly understood how the aggravating elements related to his murder
charge. Candland asserts that due process requires more. Due process requires that the
district court ensure that a plea is made "knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." See Alexander, 2012
UT 27, Tf 16 (citation omitted).
Despite the Statement, Candland hesitated and did not answer when the district
court asked him about the aggravating elements of the murder charge (R. 264: 12-14).
Candland asserts that his confusion is apparent when taking into account his failure to
answer arid the letters he later sent to the court. For these reasons and the reasons set
forth in his opening brief, Candland asks this Court to allow him to withdraw his plea.
II.

STATE V. CORWELL IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE

The State does not dispute that the district court failed to mention Candland's
waiver of his right to appeal. Instead, the State asserts that because the judge
incorporated Candland's Statement into the record, "the established law did not require
further explanation from the trial court". See Aplee. Br. at 24. Candland disagrees and
asserts that State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, 114 P.3d 276, is distinguishable, and that due
process requires more in this case.
In Corwell, the defendant, Corwell, and a co-defendant, entered Sery pleas, and
Corwell subsequently moved to withdraw her plea asserting a rule 11(e) violation for the
district court failing to mention her "speedy" trial rights and not specifically delineating
the limits placed on her right to appeal if she pleaded guilty. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 1.
The district court denied the motion. Id. at ^ 8.
5

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court failed to discuss the
right to a "speedy" trial and failed to inform Corwell of the specific limitations on her
right to appeal. Id. at 19.
On certiorari, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals. Regarding whether
leaving out the word "speedy" during the plea colloquy violated rule 11(e), this Court
observed that a plea affidavit was incorporated into the record, which informed Corwell
that she had the "right to a trial in open court by an impartial jury" and that she was
waiving "that right by pleading guilty." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ^f 4. Trial counsel
indicated on the record that he had reviewed the plea affidavit with Corwell and believed
that she understood it. Id. In addition, the district court asked Corwell whether she had
sufficient time to review her plea affidavit and whether she understood its contents. Id.
at f 5. Corwell responded affirmatively. Id. The district court went on to have a colloquy
with both defendants regarding the trial that was set the following Monday. Id. Both
defendants affirmed that they understood they were giving up the trial scheduled for the
following Monday by pleading guilty. Id.
This Court noted that "strict compliance" does not require a district court to follow
a "particular script." Id. a t ^f 12. This Court found that Corwell "had an adequate
conceptual understanding of her right to a speedy trial," given the fact that the trial was
scheduled to begin only one business day after she entered her plea and given the fact that
the district court repeatedly warned her that she would be giving up her "trial next
Monday." M a t If 19.
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Regarding the right of appeal, this Court disagreed that rule 11(e) required the
district court to explain the "numerous appeal issues that she [would] waive[] by pleading
guilty." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 20. Instead, this Court held that rule 11(e) does not
require "a detailed explanation of how a guilty plea may affect the particular grounds for
appeal." Id. This Court also held that "the district court is not required to separately
communicate the individual aspects of a defendant's limited right to appeal." Id.
(emphasis added).
This Court further observed that "just prior to the plea colloquy," the following
exchange Occurred:
trial counsel for Corwell's co-defendant informed the district court that defendants
were going to plead guilty under Sery, reserving their right to appeal the denial of
their motions to suppress. The court, providing clarification, responded by stating
that a Sery plea, "so everybody is clear on that, means you can appeal it."
Id. atffl[6, 21, n. 3. In the same footnote, this Court concluded, "This statement,
informing defendants that they could appeal the denial of their motions to suppress, is
consistent with the fact that their rights to appeal were otherwise limited." Id. at f 21, n.
3. In addition, this Court noted that while the district court "did not discuss the limited
right of appeal" during the plea colloquy, the "plea affidavit adequately described the
limits on her right to appeal...." and the plea affidavit was properly incorporated into the
record. Id. at f 21. Accordingly, this Court held "that the record supports the district
court's conclusion that Corwell was informed of her limited right of appeal." Id.
Candland asserts that Corwell does not support the State's argument that a plea
affidavit properly incorporated into the record, without further explanation from the
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district court, satisfies due process or rule 11(e). The district court must determine for
itself whether a defendant understands the constitutional rights being waived.
In this case, the district court never discussed with Candland or Candland's
counsel that he would be waiving his right to appeal if he pleaded guilty. This case is
distinguishable from Corwell, since the district court in Corwell specifically stated and
explained on the record during the same hearing when the plea was entered, the fact that
the defendant could file an appeal on the motion to dismiss. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28,
f 21 n. 3. In this case, however, the only comment by the district court referencing an
appeal was the awkward exchange made just after the prosecutor gave the factual basis
for the charge, wherein the district court stated: "Those facts are sufficient to establish the
charge against you. Now, my conclusion on that point is something that you would not
be able to appeal; do you understand that, sir?" (R. 264: 10).
While the district court: enquired of Candland whether he read through and
understood his Statement, the district court never enquired of Candland's counsel
whether counsel believed that Candland understood the rights he would be waiving by
pleading guilty (R. 264: 7). Moreover, the district court's sole reference to an appeal was
made referring only to the proffered factual basis against him and the district court's
statement that Candland could not appeal the district court's conclusion that "[tjhose facts
are sufficient to establish the charge against you." (R. 264: 9-10).
By only telling Candland that he could not appeal the conclusion that "[t]hose
facts are sufficient to establish the charge against you," the district court failed to
ascertain whether Candland understood that he was waiving his right to appeal his
8

conviction if he pleaded guilty. Taken in context, where Candland hesitated and did not
clearly admit to the factual basis and where the district court did not clarify that by
entering a plea, he would not only be waiving the right to appeal a legal conclusion but
his right to appeal the entire conviction, there is little reason to speculate as to why
Candland asked that his plea be withdrawn the very next day due to confusion.
As set forth in Candland's opening brief, the district court reviewed the entire
record when considering Candland5s motion to withdraw his plea, and the district court
should have recognized that it failed to adequately ensure that Candland was aware that
he would be waiving his right to appeal his entire conviction, rather than just waiving his
right to appeal a legal conclusion (R. 258: 15).
For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Candland5s opening brief, Candland
asks that he be allowed to withdraw his plea.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Candland asks this Court to reverse the district court's
denial of his motion to withdraw plea, and to remand this matter to the district court with
instructions to grant the motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) H _ day of February, 2013.

Aaron P. Dodd
Counsel for Appellant
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